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In early December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions highlights the core principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and ending wars—though how this fits with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This change is significant, but analysts note it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Intervention

A similar tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.